The Rise and Fall of the INF Treaty: From Reagan and Gorbachev’s Historic Agreement to Russia’s 2025 Withdrawal
- TPP
- Aug 5
- 6 min read
Reagan’s ‘Zero Option’ Sparked Hope, the ‘Double Zero’ Sealed a Deal—Until Decades of Tension Broke It Apart.
It was the late 1970s, and the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was heating up in a frightening way. The world was already living under the threat of nuclear war, but a new type of weapon made things even more unstable: intermediate-range missiles.
These missiles—fast, mobile, and deadly—could hit targets in under 10 minutes, giving almost no time for detection or response. They weren’t meant to defend. They were meant to strike first.
The trouble started when the Soviet Union deployed the SS-20 missile across Europe. Each SS-20 carried three nuclear warheads, and its mobility made it almost impossible to track. Western Europe felt like it had a loaded gun pointed at its head.
In response, the United States made a bold move. Backed by its NATO allies, it decided to deploy its own missiles in Europe: the Pershing II and the Tomahawk cruise missile. The Pershing II was especially fearsome—it could hit near Moscow in under 10 minutes, with deadly accuracy.
Suddenly, both sides had weapons that could wipe out the other’s command centers before anyone could blink. It was like building a house of matches next to a bonfire.
People began to ask: What happens if there’s a mistake? A false alarm? A misreading of radar? Could the world end in just minutes?
The Soviet leadership was especially uneasy. They feared a “bolt from the blue”—a surprise U.S. attack that could wipe them out before they had time to retaliate. To prepare for the worst, they developed a terrifying system called the “Dead Hand”—a computer-controlled trigger that could automatically launch nuclear missiles if Soviet sensors detected an attack, even if the leadership was already dead.
Meanwhile, ordinary people across Europe were terrified. Mass protests filled the streets. Citizens demanded peace. They wanted their leaders to talk—not launch.
The “Zero Option”
In 1981, newly elected U.S. President Ronald Reagan faced a world teetering on the edge. Though he had a reputation as a hardliner, Reagan also believed in negotiation—if it led to real results.
That year, Reagan made a dramatic offer: the "Zero Option."
Under this proposal, the U.S. promised not to deploy its missiles in Europe if the Soviets agreed to remove their SS-20s and similar weapons. It was bold—and risky. But it put the pressure squarely on the Soviets.
Soviet leaders weren’t ready to give up their advantage, and when the U.S. started missile deployments in 1983, the Soviets walked out of the talks altogether.
It seemed diplomacy had failed.
Then came a new face—and a new opportunity. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev was open to change. He believed in reform. And he knew the nuclear arms race was draining his country’s strength.
Talks resumed.
This time, negotiators split the discussions into three parts:
INF – intermediate-range nuclear forces.
START – long-range nuclear weapons.
SDI – the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (a missile shield, which the Soviets hated).
Each topic had its own challenges. The Soviets worried about U.S. allies like Britain and France, who had their own nuclear forces. The U.S. worried about Soviet missiles in Asia. And both sides disagreed bitterly about SDI.
The talks dragged. Nothing moved.
Reykjavik – Almost a Miracle
Then came a turning point in October 1986, in an unlikely place: Reykjavik, Iceland.
There, Reagan and Gorbachev met face to face. For nearly two days, they argued, dreamed, and almost made history. Gorbachev made a surprising offer: let’s eliminate not just intermediate-range missiles—but also short-range ones.
This became the “double zero” proposal: both countries would get rid of all land-based nuclear missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
Reagan liked the idea—but Gorbachev had a condition: scrap SDI. Reagan refused. Talks broke down—again.
But this time, something was different. Both sides walked away with a clearer sense that peace was possible.
A Treaty is Born
In 1987, momentum returned. NATO allies gave their blessing to the double-zero deal. Public support was strong. Negotiators made progress.
And finally, on December 8, 1987, in a ceremony in Washington, D.C., Reagan and Gorbachev sat down, side by side, and signed the INF Treaty.
The world watched.
What the Treaty Did
The INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty was revolutionary.
It eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons.
It called for the destruction of 2,619 missiles, along with their launchers and support equipment.
About two-thirds of the missiles were Soviet; the rest were American.
Warheads were kept, but could no longer be used on INF-class missiles.
Most importantly, for the first time, it introduced on-site inspections. Teams of observers from both countries could watch the destruction and visit bases to ensure compliance.
The treaty didn’t cover missiles launched from ships, planes, or submarines—but it was still a major breakthrough.
It was also the first successful treaty since SALT II (which had failed ratification), and the first to require actual destruction, not just limits.
Cracks in the Foundation
But even the most groundbreaking treaties are vulnerable to changing times, shifting interests, and rising geopolitical pressures. And so, what began as a symbol of restraint and cooperation would, decades later, begin to unravel.
The first cracks began to show in the early 2000s. In 2002, the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which had been another cornerstone of Cold War arms control. The move sparked alarm in Moscow, where officials viewed it as a sign that Washington was tilting the balance of strategic stability in its favor.
Then in 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly questioned the value of the INF Treaty itself. He argued that the agreement no longer served Russia’s national interests. The world had changed dramatically since 1987, and so had the threats.
Putin’s concerns were centered on two major shifts:
The growing presence of U.S. missile defense systems in Europe, which Russia believed could undermine its ability to retaliate in a conflict.
The rapid rise of military powers like China, which was not bound by the INF Treaty and was free to build a growing arsenal of intermediate-range missiles—especially in the Asia-Pacific region.
Moscow began to see the INF Treaty as a Cold War relic that restricted Russia’s options while allowing others to build freely. The sense of strategic imbalance grew.
Collapse and Consequences
The final unraveling began in February 2019, when the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump formally suspended U.S. participation in the INF Treaty.
The U.S. accused Russia of developing and deploying a banned ground-launched cruise missile, claiming it violated the treaty’s strict range limits. The alleged missile could be launched from land and had a range falling within the prohibited 500–5,500 km window.
Russia denied the allegations. It insisted that the missile in question was compliant with the treaty and, in return, accused the U.S. of developing its own systems that blurred or outright ignored INF boundaries. Moscow pointed to Washington’s long-standing withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the placement of launchers in Eastern Europe that could theoretically be converted to fire offensive missiles.
With mutual accusations flying and neither side willing to back down, both countries effectively withdrew. The treaty, though not formally torn apart, was now dead in practice.
And by 2025, Russia made it official.
In a move signaling the final collapse of the INF Treaty, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Moscow no longer considered itself bound by the accord. They declared that the conditions underpinning the treaty had “disappeared.”
Russia accused the West—especially the United States—of military escalation. Moscow cited the deployment of the U.S. Typhon missile system in the Philippines, as well as missile drills in Australia during the Talisman Sabre exercises, as provocative acts that directly threatened Russian national security.
The Kremlin stated bluntly that Western actions now undermined global stability and left Russia with no choice but to step away from the treaty completely.
With both the U.S. and Russia free to develop and deploy previously banned missile systems, the world once again faces the danger of a new arms race—but this time in a more complex, multipolar world where other powers like China and India are also nuclear-armed and unconstrained by Cold War-era agreements.
Epilogue: A Legacy in Ashes
The INF Treaty once stood as a beacon of hope—a symbol that even the fiercest enemies could step back from the brink of destruction. For over three decades, it kept some of the most dangerous nuclear weapons off the battlefield and gave the world a measure of stability during uncertain times.
But treaties, like trust, are fragile.
What began as a triumph of diplomacy has now become a cautionary tale. The collapse of the INF Treaty marks not just the end of a historic agreement, but the erosion of a broader arms control architecture that helped restrain nuclear conflict for decades.
No new agreement has risen in its place.
And with no guardrails, the international community now faces the unsettling reality of a future where fast-strike, land-based nuclear missiles could once again return to frontlines around the world—this time with even fewer checks and balances.
The fall of the INF Treaty is not just about weapons. It’s about the choices nations make between cooperation and confrontation, between dialogue and escalation. It’s a story that reminds us: peace must be maintained, not assumed—and that progress can, if neglected, be undone.
Comments