Daily Current Affairs - 16 & 17 September 2026
Today’s Top Current Affairs for UPSC: Key national and international developments explained for Prelims and Mains, with quick revision points and practice questions.
Hindi Diwas: How the Constituent Assembly Resolved India’s Language Question
Hindi Diwas is observed on September 14 to commemorate the Constituent Assembly’s decision on September 14, 1949, to adopt Hindi in the Devanagari script as the official language of the Union.
The distinction is important: the Constitution does not declare Hindi—or any other language—the “national language” of India.
Article 343 specifically uses the term “official language of the Union.”
The decision emerged from one of the Constituent Assembly’s most difficult debates. Some members wanted Hindi to replace English rapidly, while representatives from several non-Hindi-speaking regions opposed linguistic uniformity and sought continued use of English.
The eventual constitutional settlement therefore attempted to balance the promotion of Hindi with India’s multilingual character.
The Munshi-Ayyangar Formula
The compromise is commonly associated with K M Munshi and N Gopalaswami Ayyangar and became the basis of the Constitution’s official-language provisions.
Under Article 343, Hindi in Devanagari script became the Union's official language, while the international form of Indian numerals was prescribed for Union official purposes.
Crucially, English was allowed to continue for Union purposes for 15 years after the Constitution commenced, and Parliament was empowered to provide for its continued use thereafter.
That transition did not result in English disappearing in 1965.
The Official Languages Act, 1963, which took effect for this purpose from January 26, 1965, provides for English to continue in addition to Hindi for Union official purposes and parliamentary business.
It also contains safeguards concerning communication between the Union and states that have not adopted Hindi as their official language.
The settlement illustrates a broader feature of Indian federalism: linguistic diversity was accommodated rather than constitutionally replaced by a single national language.
What Does the Constitution Say About Languages?
The main constitutional provisions are contained in Part XVII (Articles 343–351).
Article 343 concerns the Union's official language; Article 344 provides for an Official Language Commission and parliamentary committee; Articles 345–347 concern regional/state languages and certain linguistic situations; Article 348 deals with language in the Supreme Court, High Courts and authoritative legislative texts; and Articles 350A and 350B contain protections concerning linguistic minorities.
Article 351 directs the Union to promote the spread and development of Hindi.
Separately, the Eighth Schedule currently contains 22 languages.
Inclusion in the Eighth Schedule should not be confused with designation as a “national language.”
The language question consequently reflects two constitutional objectives that coexist: facilitating Union administration and communication while protecting India's linguistic pluralism and federal diversity.
Hindi Diwas and India’s Linguistic Diversity
Hindi Diwas has been observed on September 14 since 1953, commemorating the 1949 Constituent Assembly decision and promoting the use of Hindi in official work.
The latest completed population census with detailed language data remains Census 2011.
Its language tables are therefore historical 2011 data, not a description of the precise linguistic distribution in 2026.
The census recorded Hindi as India's largest language category by mother tongue, but India continues to contain a very large number of mother tongues and major regional languages.
The constitutional arrangement is therefore better understood not as establishing linguistic uniformity, but as a political and federal compromise between language promotion, administrative practicality and linguistic identity.
Prelims Quick Revision
Hindi Diwas: September 14.
On September 14, 1949, the Constituent Assembly adopted Hindi in Devanagari script as the official language of the Union.
The Constitution does not designate Hindi as India's national language.
Article 343: Official language of the Union = Hindi in Devanagari script.
Numerals for Union official purposes: international form of Indian numerals.
Article 343 initially provided for continued use of English for 15 years from commencement of the Constitution.
Official Languages Act, 1963: provides for continued use of English in addition to Hindi for specified Union purposes after January 26, 1965.
Part XVII: Articles 343–351, dealing with Official Language.
Article 345: official language/languages of a State.
Article 348: language of the Supreme Court, High Courts and authoritative legislative texts.
Article 350A: facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage for children belonging to linguistic minority groups.
Article 350B: Special Officer for linguistic minorities.
Article 351: directive for development and spread of Hindi.
Eighth Schedule: currently contains 22 languages.
Hindi Diwas has been observed since 1953.
UPI Payments up to ₹2,000 to Remain Free: Why the Government Clarified the Rules
The Union government has notified that banks and payment-system providers cannot directly or indirectly charge either the payer or recipient for specified UPI transactions of up to ₹2,000 and RuPay debit-card payments.
The clarification is important because a recent amendment to the Payment and Settlement Systems (PSS) Act, 2007 had created uncertainty over whether India's zero-charge UPI framework was changing.
The larger policy debate is about balancing two objectives: keeping small digital payments inexpensive enough to encourage widespread adoption while ensuring that banks and payment companies can finance the infrastructure needed to operate an increasingly large payment network.
Why the ₹2,000 Threshold Matters
According to the figures accompanying the government's decision, India recorded more than 24,000 crore UPI transactions worth about ₹314 lakh crore in 2025-26. Yet only around 4% of person-to-merchant (P2M) transactions exceeded ₹2,000, while those transactions represented roughly two-thirds of P2M value.
This illustrates the difference between transaction volume and transaction value.
A very large number of small payments can dominate transaction count, while a relatively small number of larger purchases account for most of the money transferred.
NPCI's latest monthly statistics show the scale continuing to expand: in August 2026 alone, UPI processed about 24.51 billion transactions worth ₹29.82 lakh crore, with 752 banks live on the network.
UPI, NPCI and RBI: Who Does What?
Unified Payments Interface (UPI) is an instant payment system developed and operated by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI).
It enables interoperable transfers between participating bank accounts and other eligible payment instruments through mobile applications.
The institutional distinction is important:
NPCI operates UPI; RBI regulates and supervises the payment-system framework.
Under the PSS Act, 2007, a payment system cannot generally operate in India without RBI authorisation.
RBI therefore provides the statutory regulatory framework, while NPCI manages UPI's underlying infrastructure, operating rules and participating ecosystem.
UPI's success has been driven by interoperability, instant settlement experience, QR-based acceptance, low merchant entry costs, smartphone penetration, bank-account integration and a large network effect.
It has consequently become an important component of India's Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI).
What Is Merchant Discount Rate?
The Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) is the charge associated with processing a merchant's digital payment.
It can finance costs incurred by acquiring banks, payment-service providers and other participants in the payment chain.
Since January 2020, prescribed UPI and RuPay debit-card transactions have operated under a zero-MDR policy.
Instead, the government has supported low-value merchant payments through the Incentive Scheme for Promotion of RuPay Debit Cards and Low-Value BHIM-UPI Transactions (P2M).
The economic policy question is therefore one of sustainability.
Zero charges encourage small merchants and consumers to adopt digital payments, but processing transactions still involves costs such as technology infrastructure, cybersecurity, fraud prevention, dispute resolution and settlement systems.
The 2026 changes should consequently be understood as a move towards a more differentiated framework rather than evidence that ordinary small-value UPI payments have become chargeable.
Whether and how charges could apply to other categories depends on the applicable statutory framework and subsequent government/regulatory decisions.
Prelims Quick Revision
UPI: Unified Payments Interface.
Developed and operated by NPCI.
NPCI: National Payments Corporation of India; an umbrella organisation for retail payment systems.
RBI: regulator and supervisor of India's payment and settlement systems under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007.
P2P: Person-to-Person payment.
P2M: Person-to-Merchant payment.
MDR: Merchant Discount Rate—the charge associated with processing merchant digital payments.
Transaction volume/count = number of transactions; transaction value = total money transferred.
August 2026 UPI volume: approximately 24.51 billion transactions; value: about ₹29.82 lakh crore.
UPI is an interoperable/open-loop payment system rather than a payment facility restricted to a single company's users.
Under the PSS Act, payment-system operators generally require RBI authorisation.
The zero-charge framework has helped UPI function as a widely accessible part of India's Digital Public Infrastructure.
Possible Mains Question
UPI's rapid expansion has created a policy trade-off between universal, low-cost digital payments and the financial sustainability of payment-system providers. Examine how India can preserve UPI's public-infrastructure character while ensuring adequate investment in innovation, cybersecurity and payment infrastructure.
UPI Payments Above ₹2,000 to Attract 0.4% MDR: What Changes from October 15?
India's zero-MDR framework for UPI is set for a significant change. From October 15, 2026, specified person-to-merchant (P2M) UPI transactions above ₹2,000 will attract a Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) of 0.4%, according to the new framework announced by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI).
The charge is to be borne by the merchant rather than the person making the payment. The Department of Financial Services has also published a press release and FAQs on the new MDR framework.
This is important because it represents a shift from the broad zero-MDR regime introduced for UPI in 2020, while retaining free payments for individuals and protecting low-value transactions that account for most UPI usage.
What Exactly Changes?
For covered P2M payments above ₹2,000, the MDR will generally be 0.4%, subject to a maximum charge of ₹300 per transaction.
Thus, a ₹10,000 eligible merchant payment would generate an MDR of ₹40, while the cap means the charge stops increasing once the applicable transaction reaches ₹75,000.
However, the headline “UPI above ₹2,000 is chargeable” is incomplete.
Person-to-person (P2P) transfers remain free regardless of transaction size. Small merchants classified under the P2PM category—typically those receiving less than ₹1 lakh per month through UPI—also retain mandatory zero MDR.
There are also concessional arrangements for specified merchant categories such as railways, telecom services, insurance and fuel, where reporting on the notified framework indicates a flat ₹5 MDR for eligible transactions above ₹2,000.
Why Introduce MDR Now?
UPI has reached enormous scale. NPCI data show that in August 2026 alone, the system processed about 24.51 billion transactions worth ₹29.82 lakh crore, with 752 banks live on UPI.
But a digital payment is not costless to operate. Banks, payment service providers and apps must invest in servers and network capacity, cybersecurity, fraud detection, dispute resolution, payment acceptance and technological upgrades.
The RBI has therefore supported the new framework as a way of strengthening the long-term financial sustainability of the UPI ecosystem, allowing continued investment and innovation while keeping ordinary users outside the MDR charge.
The distinction between transaction volume and transaction value is also important. According to the government's figures, P2M payments above ₹2,000 constitute only about 4% of merchant UPI transactions by number, but account for roughly two-thirds of P2M transaction value.
The framework therefore seeks to generate revenue primarily from relatively high-value commercial payments without imposing charges on the large number of everyday low-ticket payments.
The Larger Policy Trade-off
India initially used zero MDR as a tool for building a massive digital-payment network. The policy reduced the cost of accepting UPI for merchants and helped QR-based payments penetrate even very small businesses.
But once a payment network reaches such scale, policymakers face a different problem: who pays for maintaining it?
Government subsidies can preserve zero charges, while MDR allows some of the cost to be recovered from commercial transactions.
The new differentiated framework attempts to combine both approaches—protecting P2P, small merchants and low-value payments while allowing payment-system participants to earn revenue from larger commercial transactions.
A key implementation issue will be preventing merchants from indirectly passing MDR on to consumers, which could weaken the convenience and price advantage that contributed to UPI's rapid adoption.
El Niño and Geopolitical Tensions Put Pressure on Food Prices
India's 2026 southwest monsoon has been marked by uneven rainfall across time and regions, raising concerns about agricultural output and food inflation.
The problem is not simply how much rain India receives during the season. When and where that rain falls can be equally important for crop yields.
The immediate concern is being amplified by a strengthening El Niño.
NOAA's latest assessment, issued on September 10, confirms that El Niño is strengthening and gives a greater than 90% probability of a very strong event during the Northern Hemisphere autumn and winter of 2026-27.
The Niño-3.4 sea-surface-temperature anomaly had reached about +1.8°C in August.
Why El Niño Can Disrupt the Indian Monsoon
El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is a coupled ocean-atmosphere phenomenon in the tropical Pacific. Its three commonly discussed states are El Niño, La Niña and ENSO-neutral.
El Niño involves unusually warm conditions in the central/eastern equatorial Pacific together with associated atmospheric changes.
For India, El Niño is often associated with a weaker southwest monsoon, but the relationship is not deterministic: every El Niño does not produce a drought, and other ocean-atmospheric systems can modify its effects.
This year illustrates why the seasonal rainfall total alone can be misleading.
The source article reports that July received rainfall around 1% above the Long Period Average (LPA), aided by persistent low-pressure systems, whereas August recorded a 16.3% deficit despite six such systems.
By September 13, cumulative all-India seasonal rainfall was reported at 14.7% below LPA.
For agriculture, extended dry spells during critical crop stages can reduce yields even if heavy rainfall later improves the seasonal total.
Conversely, intense rainfall over a short period can cause waterlogging, erosion and crop damage rather than compensate fully for an earlier moisture deficit.
From Weather Shock to Food Inflation
Kharif sowing acreage does not by itself reveal the eventual harvest. The article reports 1,096.5 lakh hectares under kharif crops by September 11, only around 1.4% below the corresponding 2025 level.
But crops already sown may experience moisture or heat stress, affecting yield per hectare.
A strong El Niño can also matter beyond the kharif harvest.
Higher temperatures and water stress could affect the subsequent rabi season, including wheat, mustard, pulses and several horticultural crops.
Food prices are simultaneously exposed to international shocks. Geopolitical conflict can increase crude-oil, natural-gas, fertiliser, freight and insurance costs.
Higher diesel and transport costs affect movement of agricultural produce, while expensive natural gas can affect fertiliser production. Thus:
Weather shock → lower/uncertain yields → tighter supply → higher food prices
while
Geopolitical disruption → energy/fertiliser/freight costs → higher farm and distribution costs → additional food-price pressure.
Food inflation can therefore persist even after the original weather shock ends because inventories have already fallen, crop cycles take months to recover and higher input costs continue through the supply chain.
Managing Food-Price Volatility
Policy responses extend beyond monetary policy. Buffer stocks and calibrated market releases, timely imports where necessary, efficient procurement, better storage and logistics, crop diversification and climate-resilient agriculture can address supply constraints more directly.
Monetary policy faces a particular challenge because raising interest rates cannot produce more food after a failed crop.
However, persistent food inflation can spill into wages, services and household inflation expectations. The central bank therefore has to distinguish between a temporary supply shock and broader, persistent inflation.
Long-term food and price security increasingly depends on climate resilience—drought- and heat-tolerant varieties, efficient irrigation, soil-moisture conservation, weather advisories, diversified cropping and improved water management.
Prelims Quick Revision
ENSO: El Niño-Southern Oscillation, a coupled ocean-atmosphere phenomenon centred on the tropical Pacific.
El Niño: unusually warm central/eastern equatorial Pacific conditions accompanied by atmospheric changes.
La Niña: opposite/cool phase of ENSO.
ENSO-neutral: neither El Niño nor La Niña conditions dominate.
El Niño is often associated with weaker Indian southwest monsoon rainfall, but does not automatically cause drought.
NOAA reported the Niño-3.4 anomaly at +1.8°C in August 2026.
NOAA currently gives a greater than 90% chance of a very strong El Niño during fall/winter 2026-27.
NOAA also stresses that greater ENSO strength does not guarantee a particular regional impact.
LPA: Long Period Average, used as a benchmark for rainfall comparison.
Agricultural performance depends on rainfall amount + spatial distribution + temporal distribution + crop-stage timing.
Food inflation can originate from both domestic supply shocks and international energy/fertiliser/logistics shocks.
Possible Mains Question
Food inflation in India is increasingly influenced by the interaction of climate variability and global geopolitical disruptions. Discuss with reference to El Niño, agricultural production, energy prices and supply-chain costs.
RRI Scientists Find a ‘Single-Shot’ Way to Protect Quantum Entanglement
Scientists at the Quantum Information and Computing (QuIC) laboratory of the Raman Research Institute (RRI), Bengaluru, have demonstrated a new method to control the decay of quantum entanglement, one of the major obstacles to reliable quantum computing.
The research shows that a single operation applied at the right time can delay—and under suitable conditions avert—what is known as entanglement sudden death.
RRI announced the work in September 2026; the underlying peer-reviewed study, Temporal steering of entanglement decay with single-shot control, was published in Physical Review A in July 2026.
The finding is significant because quantum information is extremely sensitive to environmental disturbances. Improving the ability to preserve quantum states is therefore essential for developing larger and more reliable quantum systems.
Qubits, Entanglement and Decoherence
Classical computers encode information in bits, which take values of either 0 or 1. A quantum bit or qubit can instead exist in a quantum superposition of basis states until measurement.
Qubits can also become entangled. In an entangled system, correlations between particles cannot generally be described by assigning each particle an independent quantum state.
Measurements on the particles consequently exhibit correlations that have no classical equivalent. Entanglement is an important resource for quantum computing, communication and sensing.
The difficulty is decoherence—the degradation of quantum coherence when a system interacts with its environment.
Noise, temperature fluctuations, electromagnetic disturbances and imperfections in hardware can destroy the quantum properties needed for computation.
In some noisy systems, entanglement can disappear completely within a finite time rather than merely decaying gradually. This phenomenon is called entanglement sudden death (ESD).
Why the RRI Experiment Matters
The RRI researchers experimentally demonstrated that the subsequent evolution of entanglement can be altered through a well-timed local operation. Depending on when that intervention was made, it could delay, prevent or even accelerate entanglement sudden death.
The central insight is therefore that timing itself can act as a control resource.
This does not mean that the experiment has solved quantum decoherence generally or eliminated the need for quantum error correction.
Error correction remains fundamental for fault-tolerant quantum computing. Instead, single-shot control offers another technique for managing the evolution of fragile quantum states and could potentially complement broader error-control strategies.
A quantum gate, meanwhile, is an operation that deliberately transforms the state of one or more qubits.
Just as logic gates manipulate classical bits, sequences of quantum gates constitute quantum algorithms.
The challenge is performing these operations accurately before noise destroys the useful quantum information.
India and the Quantum Technology Race
Quantum computing could provide major advantages for certain specialised problems, including quantum-system simulation, materials and drug research, optimisation and some cryptographic or mathematical tasks.
A demonstrated computational benefit over the best practical classical methods for a specified task is broadly described as quantum advantage.
Quantum computers, however, are not expected simply to replace classical computers. Conventional systems remain better suited to most everyday computing tasks.
For India, quantum technology is also a strategic capability. The National Quantum Mission (NQM) was approved in 2023 with an outlay of ₹6,003.65 crore for 2023-24 to 2030-31. Its objectives include developing intermediate-scale quantum computers with 50–1,000 physical qubits, quantum communication networks, quantum sensing and metrology, and quantum materials and devices.
Four thematic hubs have been established for Quantum Computing, Quantum Communication, Quantum Sensing & Metrology, and Quantum Materials & Devices.
Prelims Quick Revision
Qubit: basic unit of quantum information.
Superposition: allows a quantum system to exist in a combination of basis states before measurement.
Quantum entanglement: non-classical correlations between quantum systems.
Decoherence: loss/degradation of quantum coherence through interaction with the environment.
Entanglement Sudden Death: complete disappearance of entanglement within a finite time under certain noisy dynamics.
RRI researchers demonstrated single-shot control of entanglement decay by carefully timing an operation.
The operation can delay or avert ESD under appropriate experimental conditions; incorrect timing can also accelerate it.
Quantum error correction: protects logical quantum information by encoding it across multiple physical qubits and detecting/correcting errors without directly measuring the encoded quantum information.
Quantum gate: operation that transforms qubit states.
Quantum advantage: useful computational advantage of a quantum system over relevant classical methods for a particular task.
India's National Quantum Mission: ₹6,003.65 crore, 2023-24 to 2030-31.
NQM targets quantum computing, communication, sensing/metrology and materials/devices.
Possible Mains Question
Decoherence remains one of the principal obstacles to scalable quantum computing. Explain quantum decoherence and examine how advances in quantum-state control and error correction can contribute to the development of reliable quantum computers.
Chandrayaan-1 Data Reveal Evidence of a Possibly Ancient Hidden Lunar Impact Basin
Scientists from the Physical Research Laboratory (PRL), Ahmedabad, have used mineralogical data from India's Chandrayaan-1 mission to strengthen evidence for an ancient, heavily degraded impact structure called the Australe North Basin on the Moon.
PRL has described Australe North as an approximately 880-km-wide basin centred near 35.5°S, 96°E, and says it could potentially be older than the enormous South Pole-Aitken Basin.
The finding demonstrates the continuing scientific value of data collected by Chandrayaan-1, which was launched in 2008 and operated for less than a year.
Its instruments mapped the Moon's topography, chemistry and mineralogy, creating datasets that researchers continue to analyse today.
How Scientists Can Detect a ‘Hidden’ Impact Basin
An impact crater forms when an asteroid, meteoroid or other object strikes a planetary surface at high velocity.
Very large impacts can produce impact basins, which extend hundreds of kilometres and can contain complex rings and major structural and geological changes.
Australe North is difficult to recognise visually because billions of years of subsequent impacts and geological processes have heavily degraded its original topographic structure.
PRL notes that it lacks the prominent topographic rings normally associated with major lunar basins; evidence for its ring structure had previously been identified using GRAIL gravity data.
Researchers can therefore combine several types of remote-sensing evidence—topography, morphology, gravity and mineralogical composition—rather than relying only on photographs of the lunar surface.
Mineralogy is particularly useful because large impacts excavate material from below the surface. Studying minerals exposed around an ancient basin can consequently provide clues about the Moon's crust, mantle and geological evolution.
Chandrayaan-1 and the Moon Mineralogy Mapper
Chandrayaan-1 carried 11 scientific instruments: five Indian and six international payloads. One was NASA's Moon Mineralogy Mapper (M³), an imaging spectrometer designed to map lunar surface mineralogy.
M³ measured reflected sunlight over wavelengths of approximately 0.7–3.0 micrometres. Different minerals absorb and reflect electromagnetic radiation differently at particular wavelengths, producing characteristic spectral signatures.
Scientists can analyse these signatures to infer the mineral composition of the surface without physically collecting samples.
PRL's work on Australe North has also identified evidence of magmatism and later volcanism, including activity in the Bowditch Crater region extending to around 1.7 billion years ago, as well as olivine-bearing material exposed at the central peak of Scaliger Crater.
Why Ancient Lunar Basins Matter
Determining whether Australe North really predates the South Pole-Aitken (SPA) Basin would be scientifically important because large impact basins preserve evidence from the Moon's earliest geological history.
PRL describes Australe North as possibly older than SPA, which it dates to roughly 4.2–4.3 billion years ago. This should therefore be treated as a scientific interpretation requiring further study rather than as a definitively established age.
The Moon is especially valuable for studying the early Solar System because it lacks Earth's active plate tectonics, extensive erosion and hydrological processes that continuously recycle or erase ancient geological records.
This also explains the importance of future sample-return missions: orbital spectroscopy can identify potentially important minerals and geological units, while laboratory analysis of returned rocks can provide much more precise information about their composition and age.
Prelims Quick Revision
Chandrayaan-1: India's first lunar mission; launched on 22 October 2008 aboard PSLV-C11.
Primary mission activities included chemical, mineralogical and photo-geological mapping of the Moon.
It carried 11 scientific instruments — 5 Indian and 6 international.
Moon Mineralogy Mapper (M³): NASA payload aboard Chandrayaan-1.
M³ was an imaging spectrometer operating approximately across the 0.7–3.0 µm range.
Australe North Basin: approximately 880 km wide, centred near 35.5°S, 96°E.
PRL describes it as possibly older than the South Pole-Aitken Basin; this is not yet a definitive age determination.
Impact basin: very large depression produced by a high-energy impact, generally much larger and structurally more complex than a simple crater.
Remote sensing: obtaining information about an object without direct physical contact, including through orbital imaging and spectroscopy.
Spectroscopy: studies interactions between electromagnetic radiation and matter; characteristic absorption features can identify minerals.
Lunar maria: relatively dark, basalt-rich plains produced by ancient volcanic activity.
Lunar highlands: older, brighter and more heavily cratered terrain.
India Begins Exporting Hilsa to Bangladesh: Fisheries, Ecology and Neighbourhood Trade
In an unusual reversal of the traditional trade pattern, India has begun exporting Hilsa (Ilish) to Bangladesh, with around 500 tonnes reportedly crossing through the Petrapole land port in West Bengal over the past two months.
A substantial share is being sourced from Gujarat, particularly the Bharuch region, showing that Hilsa is not confined to the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna delta.
Hilsa (Tenualosa ilisha) inhabits marine, brackish and freshwater environments and occurs across a wider Indian Ocean range.
ICAR-CIFRI records it from the Persian Gulf to Myanmar, with particularly important populations around India, Bangladesh, the Bay of Bengal and the Ganga-Brahmaputra estuaries.
Why Does Hilsa Move Between the Sea and Rivers?
Hilsa is an anadromous fish: it spends much of its life in marine or estuarine waters but migrates upstream into freshwater rivers for reproduction.
The Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna system therefore provides an important combination of large river channels, estuaries, freshwater flows and access to the Bay of Bengal needed for its life cycle.
Its upstream migration in the Ganga is strongly seasonal. An official study on Hilsa passage at Farakka records the principal upstream migration during the monsoon, especially July-October, with another smaller movement during roughly March-May.
Hilsa also occurs along India's western coast and in river systems such as the Narmada, helping explain the commercial supply from Gujarat. ICAR has previously studied Hilsa stocks and habitat preferences in the Hooghly, Narmada and Ukai reservoir systems.
Farakka Barrage and Hilsa Migration
The Farakka Barrage, commissioned on the Ganga in 1975, significantly disrupted the traditional upstream movement of Hilsa. According to ICAR-CIFRI, the species had historically migrated from the Bay of Bengal through the Ganga as far as Varanasi, Prayagraj and beyond, but became virtually absent from much of the middle and upper Ganga after the barrage affected its migration pathway.
Restoration efforts are now underway.
Under programmes involving ICAR-CIFRI and the National Mission for Clean Ganga (NMCG), interventions have included ranching, stock enhancement, breeding, tagging and monitoring. Between 2019 and June 2026, more than 3.85 lakh juvenile and adult Hilsa, over 40 lakh fertilised eggs, and approximately 9.4 lakh hatchery-produced spawn were released upstream of Farakka.
In 2026, Hilsa was again recorded near Chandauli in Uttar Pradesh, an important indicator of attempts to restore its historical range.
From Cultural Symbol to Fisheries Diplomacy
Hilsa has considerable economic, culinary and cultural importance on both sides of the India-Bangladesh border.
Bangladesh has traditionally supplied Hilsa to India, including around festive periods, making the present India-to-Bangladesh movement commercially notable.
Fisheries can also form part of wider bilateral cooperation.
India and Bangladesh already have a formal history of cooperation in this sector: a 2011 fisheries MoU provided for cooperation in fisheries and aquaculture through joint activities, scientific information and personnel exchanges.
More broadly, bilateral engagement covers trade, connectivity, water resources, energy, security, development cooperation, culture and people-to-people relations.
Fisheries trade can complement these ties through cold-chain infrastructure, processing, conservation research and sustainable management of shared aquatic ecosystems.
The current Hilsa trade also demonstrates an important economic-geography lesson: a product strongly identified culturally with one region can have a much wider ecological range and commercial supply chain.
Prelims Quick Revision
Scientific name of Hilsa: Tenualosa ilisha.
Family: Clupeidae.
Hilsa is an anadromous fish—it moves from marine/estuarine environments into freshwater for spawning.
It occurs in marine, brackish and freshwater habitats.
Important populations occur around the Bay of Bengal and Ganga-Brahmaputra estuaries, but its geographical range is much wider.
Hilsa also occurs on India's western coast, including waters associated with Gujarat.
Farakka Barrage: commissioned in 1975; significantly affected upstream Hilsa migration in the Ganga.
Hilsa historically migrated through the Ganga to Varanasi, Prayagraj and beyond.
ICAR-CIFRI: Central Inland Fisheries Research Institute, headquartered at Barrackpore.
NMCG: National Mission for Clean Ganga.
Petrapole: major India-Bangladesh land-border trade point in West Bengal.
India and Bangladesh signed an MoU on fisheries cooperation in 2011.
Possible Mains Question
Transboundary fisheries are simultaneously ecological resources, livelihood assets and instruments of neighbourhood economic cooperation. Discuss with reference to Hilsa fisheries and India-Bangladesh relations.
India and WTO Plurilateral Agreements: Is New Delhi’s Position Beginning to Shift?
India has traditionally been cautious about plurilateral agreements at the World Trade Organization (WTO)—agreements negotiated by only a subset of WTO members rather than by the entire membership.
However, language adopted in the BRICS New Delhi Declaration of September 12, 2026 suggests a potentially more flexible approach to finding a place for such initiatives within the WTO framework.
The declaration states that BRICS members recognise the importance of identifying “appropriate pathways for plurilateral initiatives into the WTO legal framework”, including development-oriented initiatives.
This is notable because India had continued to raise legal and institutional concerns over plurilateral agreements at the WTO's 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14), held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in March 2026.
This should not yet be interpreted as India having accepted any particular plurilateral agreement. Rather, it indicates willingness to discuss how plurilaterals could coexist with an inclusive, consensus-based WTO system.
Multilateral vs Plurilateral Agreements
A multilateral WTO agreement generally creates rules applicable across the WTO membership. Multilateralism is central to the WTO because countries negotiate within a common rules-based framework, with principles such as Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment limiting discrimination among trading partners.
A plurilateral agreement, by contrast, involves only participating members and normally creates obligations only for those accepting it.
Such arrangements can make negotiations easier when consensus among the full membership is difficult.
The WTO already accommodates plurilateral agreements. The 1994 Marrakesh Agreement, which established the WTO and came into force in 1995, contains Annex 4 for Plurilateral Trade Agreements.
But there is an important safeguard. Under Article X:9 of the Marrakesh Agreement, adding a new agreement to Annex 4 requires a decision “exclusively by consensus” of the WTO Ministerial Conference.
The IFD Agreement and India’s Objections
The current controversy centres on the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement.
The initiative began among a group of WTO members in 2017 and seeks to make investment procedures more transparent, predictable and efficient, thereby facilitating foreign direct investment, particularly in developing and least-developed economies.
Importantly, according to the WTO, the agreement explicitly excludes market access, investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
Participants want the IFD Agreement incorporated into Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement.
India has objected to this incorporation.
One concern is procedural: joint initiatives involving subsets of members should not, in India's view, be allowed to circumvent the WTO's consensus-based architecture.
India has also questioned the extent to which investment facilitation belongs within the WTO's negotiated mandate.
The issue remained unresolved at MC14. The WTO confirmed in July 2026 that members did not reach consensus at MC14 on incorporating the IFD Agreement into Annex 4, although the agreement has attracted support from a large majority of WTO members.
Why the BRICS Declaration Is Significant
The New Delhi Declaration does not say that India has joined the IFD Agreement or withdrawn its objections.
What has changed is the language surrounding plurilateralism.
BRICS members jointly supported identifying suitable legal pathways for plurilateral initiatives while simultaneously reaffirming the WTO's foundational principles, including MFN treatment and Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries and LDCs.
This potentially points towards a middle path:
Multilateral WTO as the foundation → plurilateral negotiations where universal consensus is difficult → agreed safeguards and legal pathways → protection of non-participants and developing-country interests.
Such an approach could allow the WTO to negotiate rules on emerging issues without requiring every member to participate from the beginning, while preventing small groups from automatically imposing obligations on the wider membership.
The underlying challenge is institutional.
Consensus protects smaller and developing economies from rules they have not accepted, but it can also make agreements among a membership with very different economic interests extremely difficult.
Plurilateralism can facilitate faster rule-making, but without adequate safeguards it can raise concerns about fragmentation, exclusion and unequal negotiating power.
Prelims Quick Revision
WTO: World Trade Organization; established through the Marrakesh Agreement, which entered into force in 1995.
Multilateral agreement: broadly involves and binds the WTO membership under the WTO framework.
Plurilateral agreement: agreement involving only a subset of members; obligations generally apply to participating members.
Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement: contains WTO Plurilateral Trade Agreements.
Article X:9: adding an agreement to Annex 4 requires a Ministerial Conference decision exclusively by consensus.
IFD: Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement.
IFD seeks greater transparency, predictability and efficiency in investment procedures.
IFD explicitly excludes market access, investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement.
IFD negotiations were finalised at MC13 in 2024.
MC14: held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in March 2026.
Consensus was not reached at MC14 on incorporating IFD into Annex 4.
BRICS New Delhi Declaration 2026: supported identifying appropriate pathways for plurilateral initiatives within the WTO legal framework.
The declaration does not by itself mean India has joined IFD or abandoned its earlier objections.
MFN: Most-Favoured-Nation treatment.
Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT): WTO provisions providing flexibilities and other special treatment for developing and least-developed members.
Rising US Treasury Yields: Why They Matter for India and the Global Economy
Government bond yields have risen sharply across several major economies, with the US Treasury market attracting particular attention because US government debt serves as a global benchmark for borrowing costs and financial asset pricing.
On September 15, 2026, the benchmark 10-year US Treasury yield briefly moved above 5%, its highest level since 2007, amid concerns about inflation, geopolitical pressures and the US fiscal outlook.
The significance extends far beyond Washington.
When relatively safe US government securities offer higher returns, investors have less incentive to take additional risks in emerging markets.
This can affect global capital flows, currencies, borrowing costs and asset prices—including in India.
What Is a Government Bond Yield?
Governments borrow because their expenditure can exceed their tax and other revenues. They raise part of this money by issuing government securities or bonds to investors.
A bond has a face value, maturity and, in many cases, a fixed coupon. Its yield represents the return an investor earns relative to the bond's market price.
The crucial relationship is:
Bond price rises → yield fallsBond price falls → yield rises
For example, suppose a ₹100 bond pays ₹5 annually. At a ₹100 market price, the simple current yield is 5%. If investors sell the bond and its price falls to ₹90, the same ₹5 payment represents a higher yield of about 5.56%.
Therefore, rising yields can indicate that investors require greater compensation for factors such as inflation, interest-rate expectations, fiscal risks or the supply of government debt.
They do not necessarily mean investors believe a government is about to default.
Why Rising US Yields Affect the World
US Treasuries occupy a central position in the international financial system. Their yields influence the rates investors demand on other government bonds, corporate debt and financial assets.
When US yields increase substantially, several effects can follow:
Higher US yields → US assets become relatively more attractive → capital can move away from emerging markets → emerging-market currencies face depreciation pressure → domestic bond yields and borrowing costs can rise.
The IMF has previously documented that increases in US interest rates can trigger portfolio outflows and currency depreciation in emerging economies, although the magnitude depends importantly on why US yields are rising and on individual countries' economic fundamentals.
For India, sustained high US yields can therefore contribute to foreign portfolio investment volatility, pressure on the rupee and higher domestic financing costs.
A weaker rupee can also make dollar-priced imports such as crude oil more expensive.
At the same time, higher government borrowing costs have fiscal implications.
As old debt matures and governments issue new securities at higher rates, the interest burden gradually increases, potentially leaving less fiscal space for infrastructure, welfare and other expenditure.
Understanding India’s Government Securities
In India, a Government Security (G-Sec) is a tradable instrument issued by the Central or State governments acknowledging their debt obligation.
RBI describes Central government securities as carrying practically no domestic-currency credit/default risk, although investors can still face market risk if they sell before maturity.
Major instruments include:
Treasury Bills (T-bills): short-term Central government securities currently issued for 91, 182 and 364 days. They are zero-coupon securities issued at a discount and redeemed at face value.
Cash Management Bills (CMBs): introduced to meet temporary government cash-flow mismatches. They resemble T-bills but generally have maturities below 91 days.
Dated G-Secs: longer-term Central government securities carrying fixed or floating coupons, generally paid half-yearly.
State Government Securities, traditionally referred to as State Development Loans (SDLs): dated securities through which state governments borrow from the market.
RBI manages government borrowing and conducts auctions for these securities.
Prelims Quick Revision
Bond: debt instrument through which an investor lends money to the issuer.
Bond yield: return earned relative to the bond's market price.
Bond price and yield move inversely.
100 basis points = 1 percentage point.
US government bonds are called Treasuries.
Indian government securities are commonly called G-Secs.
T-bills: 91-day, 182-day and 364-day Central government instruments; issued at discount and redeemed at face value.
CMBs: short-term instruments generally below 91 days for temporary cash mismatches.
Dated G-Secs: longer-term Central government securities carrying fixed or floating coupons.
State Government Securities/SDLs: market borrowings of state governments.
Rising US yields can contribute to capital outflows, currency depreciation and higher borrowing costs in emerging markets.
Rising yields do not automatically imply sovereign default risk; inflation expectations, monetary policy, fiscal outlook, debt supply and term premium can all affect yields.
The US 10-year Treasury yield crossed 5% intraday on September 15, 2026, amid concerns including inflation and the US fiscal outlook.
Kishau Multipurpose Project: Why Six States Had to Reach an Agreement
After decades of negotiations, the Chief Ministers of Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan and Delhi signed the Kishau Multipurpose Project agreement on September 15, 2026.
The project envisages a 232.6-metre-high concrete gravity dam on the Tons River, along the Uttarakhand-Himachal Pradesh border.
The Union government says it will store about 1,562 million cubic metres (MCM) of water, irrigate around 97,000 hectares, and generate approximately 1,476 million units of hydropower annually.
The agreement is important not only as a water-infrastructure project but also as a case study in inter-state water governance and cooperative federalism.
Why Was the Kishau Project Needed?
The Tons is a major tributary of the Yamuna. Kishau is one of three major storage projects conceived in the Upper Yamuna Basin, alongside Lakhwar on the Yamuna and Renukaji on the Giri.
The six basin states had earlier reached agreements on Lakhwar in 2018 and Renukaji in 2019.
Storage is important because river flows vary seasonally.
A reservoir can retain part of the high monsoon flow and release water when required for drinking, irrigation, industrial requirements and environmental flows, while also producing hydropower.
The institutional foundation goes back to the May 12, 1994 Upper Yamuna agreement, which provided for separate agreements concerning storage projects in the basin.
But allocating river water on paper is different from constructing and financing infrastructure capable of storing and delivering it.
This distinction between water allocation and water governance helps explain why Kishau remained delayed for so long.
Why Did Agreement Take So Long?
Kishau affects six governments but does not distribute its costs and benefits equally. Negotiations therefore had to address questions of project financing, water shares, hydropower costs and benefits, and the interests of the two host states—Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand.
A breakthrough was reached on June 16, 2026. The six states agreed that the Centre would provide 90% funding for the water component as central assistance, while the remaining 10% would be borne by the states.
An arrangement was also reached under which water allocated to Himachal Pradesh would go to Delhi and Rajasthan in exchange for sharing the cost of Himachal Pradesh's portion of the power component.
This illustrates why inter-state water disputes are difficult: the geographical location of water, financial burden of infrastructure and geographical distribution of benefits often do not coincide.
Cooperative Federalism and Inter-State Rivers
India's Constitution creates a special framework for inter-state rivers.
Entry 17 of the State List covers water, including irrigation and water supply, but is expressly subject to Entry 56 of the Union List, which permits Parliament to regulate and develop inter-state rivers and river valleys when this is considered expedient in the public interest.
Article 262 authorises Parliament to provide for adjudication of disputes relating to waters of inter-state rivers or river valleys. Parliament may also provide that neither the Supreme Court nor any other court exercises jurisdiction over such disputes.
The two principal laws are the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 and the River Boards Act, 1956.
Kishau illustrates a different route: instead of relying solely on adjudication, the Union government and participating states used negotiation, cost-sharing and an inter-governmental agreement to reconcile competing interests. The Ministry of Jal Shakti and other Union institutions can therefore play an important coordinating and mediating role where multiple states depend on a common river basin.
Prelims Quick Revision
Kishau Multipurpose Project: on the Tons River, a major tributary of the Yamuna.
Location: border region of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand.
Proposed dam: 232.6-metre-high concrete gravity dam.
Storage capacity: about 1,562 MCM.
Irrigation benefit: about 97,000 hectares.
Expected hydropower generation: about 1,476 million units annually.
Six participating governments: Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan and Delhi.
Upper Yamuna's three major storage projects: Kishau (Tons), Lakhwar (Yamuna) and Renukaji (Giri).
Kishau has been declared a National Project; the Centre is to bear approximately 90% of the relevant water-component financial burden.
Article 262: adjudication of disputes relating to waters of inter-state rivers or river valleys.
State List Entry 17: water, subject to Union List Entry 56.
Union List Entry 56: regulation and development of inter-state rivers and river valleys under specified conditions.
Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: statutory mechanism for adjudicating inter-state river-water disputes.
River Boards Act, 1956: provides for establishment of river boards for regulation and development of inter-state rivers and river valleys.
Possible Mains Question
The challenge of inter-state river management in India extends beyond allocating water to sharing the costs, benefits and responsibilities of river-basin development. Discuss with reference to the Kishau Multipurpose Project and the constitutional framework governing inter-state rivers.
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