Daily Current Affairs - 22, 23 & 24 September 2026
Today’s Top Current Affairs for UPSC: Key national and international developments explained for Prelims and Mains, with quick revision points and practice questions.
AI Chip Supercycle: What It Means and Where India Stands
Global semiconductor demand is entering what industry analysts describe as an AI-driven “supercycle”—a potentially multi-year expansion in chip investment and demand driven by artificial intelligence, data centres and high-performance computing.
The issue was in focus at SEMICON India 2026, held in New Delhi from September 21–23 under the theme “Building the Semiconductor Nation”, with participation from more than 600 exhibitors across over 50 countries.
Unlike a short cyclical increase in chip demand, a supercycle implies a structural shift in the source of demand.
Personal computers drove an earlier wave, smartphones another; today, AI infrastructure is creating sustained demand for accelerators, advanced memory, networking chips and data-centre hardware.
Why AI Is Driving Semiconductor Demand
A semiconductor is a material whose electrical conductivity lies between that of a conductor and an insulator. Semiconductor materials such as silicon are used to fabricate transistors, which are combined in enormous numbers to create integrated circuits (ICs), or chips.
AI requires exceptionally large numbers of mathematical operations. Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) are well suited to this because they can perform many calculations in parallel. More broadly, AI accelerators are specialised processors designed to accelerate workloads such as training and running—or inference—AI models.
The boom also affects memory chips. AI systems need to move huge quantities of data rapidly between memory and processors, increasing demand for technologies such as High Bandwidth Memory (HBM). This differs from logic chips, which primarily perform computation and control operations.
The International Energy Agency estimates that global investment in data centres nearly doubled since 2022 to about $500 billion in 2024, illustrating how AI growth is increasingly linked with physical infrastructure, electricity generation and grids—not merely software.
India's Semiconductor Strategy: From ISM 1.0 to ISM 2.0
India's first semiconductor programme concentrated on establishing the foundations of a domestic ecosystem through semiconductor fabrication, display fabs, compound semiconductors, ATMP/OSAT facilities and chip design.
The India Semiconductor Mission operates under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY).
The Union Budget 2026-27 announced India Semiconductor Mission 2.0, with an allocation of ₹1,000 crore for FY2026-27.
According to the Budget announcement, the next phase will focus on producing semiconductor equipment and materials, developing full-stack Indian intellectual property and strengthening supply chains, alongside industry-led research and training centres.
This reflects an important challenge. India already possesses a substantial semiconductor-design talent base and is building assembly, testing and packaging capacity, but advanced semiconductor manufacturing requires capabilities across the entire chain:
Design → fabrication → assembly/packaging/testing → equipment and materials
Wafer fabrication is especially capital-, technology- and infrastructure-intensive, requiring highly specialised machinery, ultra-pure materials, reliable electricity and water, skilled personnel and complex global supplier networks.
Prelims Quick Revision
Semiconductor: material with conductivity between a conductor and an insulator.
Integrated Circuit (IC): electronic circuit containing components such as transistors fabricated on semiconductor material.
GPU: Graphics Processing Unit; highly effective for parallel computation.
AI accelerator: specialised processor optimised for AI workloads.
Training: process through which an AI model learns from data.
Inference: using a trained model to generate outputs.
Memory chips: primarily store data; examples include DRAM and NAND flash.
Logic chips: perform computational and control functions.
HBM: High Bandwidth Memory; provides very high data-transfer bandwidth and is important for advanced AI computing.
Fab: semiconductor fabrication facility where chips are manufactured on wafers.
OSAT: Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test.
ATMP: Assembly, Testing, Marking and Packaging.
ISM: India Semiconductor Mission under MeitY.
ISM 2.0: announced in Union Budget 2026-27; focuses additionally on equipment, materials, Indian IP, supply chains, R&D and skills.
AI-driven semiconductor demand also has an energy dimension, because data centres require substantial electricity and supporting grid infrastructure.
Possible Mains Question
The AI-driven semiconductor supercycle presents India with an opportunity to move from being primarily a semiconductor design and consumption market towards a deeper position in the global semiconductor value chain. Examine the opportunities and challenges.
Vande Mataram Case: Supreme Court Revisits the Right Not to Sing
The Supreme Court is examining whether a person can face criminal consequences for refusing to sing Vande Mataram because of a genuine conscientious or religious objection.
The issue arose in Carnatic vocalist T M Krishna's challenge to the 2026 amendment to the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, which extended statutory protection under Section 3 to the National Song.
The Court has sought the Centre's response; it has not yet delivered a final judgment on the constitutional validity of the amendment.
The amendment makes it an offence to intentionally prevent the singing of Vande Mataram or cause disturbance to an assembly engaged in singing it.
A key constitutional question is whether this provision can also be applied to someone who simply declines to sing.
Why the 1986 Bijoe Emmanuel Judgment Matters
The Court referred to its landmark decision in Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986). Three schoolchildren belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses stood respectfully during Jana Gana Mana but did not sing it because of their religious beliefs.
The Supreme Court held that their expulsion violated Article 19(1)(a), freedom of speech and expression, and Article 25(1), freedom of conscience and religion.
Crucially, the Court said that respectfully standing without joining the singing did not amount to disrespect.
That principle is relevant to the present case because Article 25 expressly protects “freedom of conscience”, subject to public order, morality, health and other provisions of Part III.
The current proceedings therefore involve a distinction between deliberately disrupting a national song and personally declining to sing because of a conscientious objection.
Vande Mataram: History and Constitutional Status
Vande Mataram was composed by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay and became part of his novel Anandamath (1882).
Rabindranath Tagore sang it at the 1896 session of the Indian National Congress, and it subsequently became an important expression of nationalism during the freedom struggle.
Its later stanzas personify the motherland through imagery associated with Hindu divinities, which historically contributed to debate over using the complete composition as a national symbol.
Krishna's present petition similarly raises objections to compulsory rendition of all six stanzas.
On January 24, 1950, Constituent Assembly President Rajendra Prasad stated that Jana Gana Mana was India's National Anthem and that Vande Mataram, because of its historic role in the freedom struggle, should be “honoured equally” and have “equal status” with it.
This statement should not be confused with a constitutional Article: the Constitution itself does not contain a provision formally designating Vande Mataram as the National Song.
Prelims Quick Revision
Vande Mataram: composed by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay; associated with Anandamath (1882).
First sung at an INC session by Rabindranath Tagore in 1896.
January 24, 1950: Rajendra Prasad stated in the Constituent Assembly that it should be honoured equally with Jana Gana Mana.
Article 19(1)(a): freedom of speech and expression.
Article 25(1): freedom of conscience and right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to constitutional limitations.
Article 51A(a): fundamental duty to respect the Constitution, National Flag and National Anthem; it does not expressly mention the National Song.
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986): respectfully declining to sing the National Anthem because of a genuine religious belief was constitutionally protected in the circumstances of that case.
Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971: protects specified national symbols.
2026 amendment: extends Section 3 protection concerning intentional prevention/disturbance of singing to Vande Mataram.
The present Supreme Court case is pending; observations during the hearing should not be presented as its final ruling.
Supreme Court Tightens Re-Arrest Rules: Why Article 22 Matters
The Supreme Court has strengthened constitutional safeguards against arbitrary arrest, holding that a person released because the police violated Article 22 is being freed from an illegal and unconstitutional detention, not being granted bail.
In Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, decided on September 21, 2026, a Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar held that police cannot simply re-arrest such a person at their discretion.
The ruling does not create immunity from future arrest. Instead, it requires stricter judicial scrutiny before re-arrest because the first deprivation of liberty was constitutionally defective.
What Does Article 22 Protect?
Article 22(1) provides that an arrested person must be informed, as soon as possible, of the grounds of arrest and cannot be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of choice.
Article 22(2) requires an arrested person to be produced before the nearest magistrate within 24 hours, excluding travel time, and prohibits detention beyond that period without a magistrate's authority.
The Supreme Court held that the Article 22(1) requirement is not merely a procedural technicality. Grounds of arrest must be supplied in writing, and failure to comply renders the arrest unconstitutional.
The Court said these protections apply across ordinary criminal law as well as special statutes.
This complements Article 21, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.
Article 21 supplies the broad protection of personal liberty; Article 22 provides specific safeguards governing arrest and detention.
What Changes for Re-Arrest?
Where an accused has been released because Article 22 safeguards were violated, the investigating agency must now follow additional safeguards before seeking custody again.
The police must provide the accused with written grounds of arrest and approach the jurisdictional magistrate explaining why re-arrest is necessary and why the grounds were not furnished initially.
The application must carry the endorsement of the investigating officer's immediate superior.
The superior authority must also transfer the investigation to another officer and initiate a departmental inquiry into the original lapse.
Re-arrest can proceed only after the magistrate is satisfied that there were bona fide reasons for the earlier failure and that custody is genuinely necessary.
The Court also addressed compensation as a public-law remedy for unconstitutional detention, reinforcing the principle that judicial oversight is essential whenever the State deprives an individual of liberty.
Prelims Quick Revision
Case: Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab.
Judgment: September 21, 2026; neutral citation 2026 INSC 1022.
Article 21: protection of life and personal liberty.
Article 22(1): grounds of arrest + right to consult and be defended by a lawyer.
Article 22(2): production before nearest magistrate within 24 hours, excluding journey time.
Failure to furnish written grounds of arrest can make the arrest illegal and unconstitutional.
Release following such a violation is not the same as bail.
Re-arrest is possible, but requires judicial approval under the safeguards prescribed by the Court.
Investigation must be transferred to another officer where re-arrest is sought after the constitutional violation.
A departmental inquiry must be initiated into the responsible officer's lapse.
Arrest: taking a person into legal custody.
Remand: judicial authorisation for continued custody.
Bail: conditional release from custody pending proceedings.
Preventive detention: detention intended to prevent anticipated harmful conduct rather than punish a completed offence; Article 22 contains separate provisions concerning it.
Possible Mains Question
Articles 21 and 22 together seek to ensure that the State's power of arrest remains subject to constitutional due process and judicial supervision. Discuss in light of the Supreme Court's recent guidelines governing re-arrest after an unconstitutional detention.
Tarang Shakti-26: India to Host Major Multinational Air Exercise in Jodhpur
The Indian Air Force (IAF) will host the second edition of Exercise Tarang Shakti from September 26 to October 12, 2026, at Air Force Station Jodhpur and adjoining air bases in Rajasthan.
Seven foreign air forces—Australia, Bangladesh, France, Germany, Sri Lanka, the United Arab Emirates and the United States—will participate alongside India, while 32 other countries are expected as observers.
The exercise is significant because Tarang Shakti represents the IAF's move beyond predominantly bilateral engagements towards a large multinational air-combat environment, where different air forces can train together using different aircraft, operational doctrines and systems.
What Will Tarang Shakti-26 Test?
The IAF has identified three broad objectives: operational learning, greater interoperability and stronger partnerships.
Training is expected to include Beyond Visual Range (BVR) and Within Visual Range (WVR) combat, air mobility, dynamic targeting, air-to-air refuelling and combat search-and-rescue operations.
Interoperability means the ability of forces from different countries to operate together effectively. This involves much more than flying aircraft in the same airspace: crews must coordinate communications, mission planning, command-and-control procedures, identification protocols and tactical responses.
The exercise also reflects changes in modern air warfare. Recent conflicts have highlighted the importance of precision weapons, integrated air defence, unmanned systems, information dominance and space-based capabilities, as well as the ability to combine them in multi-domain operations.
Aircraft and India's Defence Capability
The IAF will field aircraft including the Rafale, Su-30MKI, Mirage-2000, MiG-29, Jaguar and indigenous Tejas. Foreign platforms are expected to include the US F-35, French Rafale, UAE F-16 and Bangladesh C-130J, among other assets.
The F-35's participation is particularly notable because it will be the aircraft's first participation in an air exercise in India, although F-35s had previously appeared at Aero India.
Tarang Shakti also provides India an opportunity to demonstrate indigenous aircraft, sensors, weapons and unmanned systems to foreign military leadership.
Germany's participation had been officially confirmed earlier in 2026 during India-Germany defence discussions.
The first Tarang Shakti was held in August-September 2024 in two phases, making the 2026 exercise its second edition.
Prelims Quick Revision
Tarang Shakti: multinational air exercise hosted by the Indian Air Force.
2026: second edition.
Dates: September 26–October 12, 2026.
Location: Air Force Station Jodhpur, Rajasthan, and adjoining air bases.
Eight participating forces: India + Australia, Bangladesh, France, Germany, Sri Lanka, UAE and USA.
32 additional countries are expected as observers.
Indian aircraft include Rafale, Su-30MKI, Tejas, Mirage-2000, MiG-29 and Jaguar.
Foreign platforms include F-35, Rafale, F-16 and C-130J.
BVR: Beyond Visual Range.
WVR: Within Visual Range.
Core objectives: operational learning, interoperability and stronger partnerships.
First Tarang Shakti: 2024, conducted in two phases.
Tarang Shakti should not be confused with India's bilateral air exercises such as Garuda (France), Cope India (US) and Veer Guardian (Japan).
Possible Mains Question
Multinational military exercises have evolved from instruments of defence diplomacy into platforms for operational learning and interoperability in multi-domain warfare. Discuss with reference to Exercise Tarang Shakti.
India Plans Lithium-Nickel Processing Scheme: Why Critical Minerals Matter
The Ministry of Mines is preparing a new incentive scheme to promote domestic processing of lithium and nickel, two minerals central to advanced battery manufacturing and India's energy transition.
Mines Secretary Keshav Chandra said on September 22 that details would be announced after the necessary approvals. The proposal should therefore be treated as an upcoming scheme, not yet a fully notified programme.
The initiative fits within the broader National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), approved in January 2025 to strengthen India's mineral value chain from exploration and mining to beneficiation, processing and recycling.
The mission runs through 2030-31, with proposed government expenditure of ₹16,300 crore and expected investment of ₹18,000 crore by PSUs and other stakeholders.
Why Lithium and Nickel Are Critical
A critical mineral is one that is economically or strategically important but faces significant supply risks because of factors such as geographical concentration, import dependence, limited processing capacity or geopolitical disruption.
India has identified 30 critical minerals. Of these, 24 were incorporated into Part D of Schedule I of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, following the 2023 amendment.
Lithium and nickel are particularly important for lithium-ion batteries. Lithium is fundamental to battery chemistry because of its electrochemical properties, while nickel is used in several cathode chemistries to increase energy density.
These batteries support electric vehicles, consumer electronics and grid-scale energy storage.
India's battery ambitions also extend beyond mineral processing. The Advanced Chemistry Cell Battery Storage PLI scheme has an outlay of ₹18,100 crore and targets 50 GWh of domestic ACC manufacturing capacity.
Critical Minerals Are Not the Same as Rare Earths
Critical minerals are classified according to their economic/strategic importance and supply vulnerability. The list can therefore differ between countries and change over time.
Rare earth elements (REEs), in contrast, are a chemically defined group of 17 elements—the 15 lanthanides plus scandium and yttrium. Rare earths can be classified as critical minerals, but not every critical mineral is a rare earth. Lithium, nickel and cobalt, for example, are critical minerals but are not rare-earth elements.
Supply-chain security is also about processing, not merely possessing mineral deposits. India's NCMM specifically seeks domestic capabilities across exploration, mining, beneficiation, processing and recycling. It also envisages four regional mineral-processing parks.
India is simultaneously developing recycling capacity.
A separate ₹1,500-crore Critical Mineral Recycling Scheme under NCMM covers lithium-ion batteries, e-waste and industrial scrap; 58 companies had been declared eligible by April 2026.
Prelims Quick Revision
Critical mineral: economically/strategically important mineral facing significant supply-chain risk.
India has identified 30 critical minerals.
Lithium: important for rechargeable batteries and energy storage.
Nickel: important in several high-energy-density battery cathode chemistries.
Lithium and nickel are critical minerals, not rare-earth elements.
REEs: 17 elements—15 lanthanides + scandium + yttrium.
NCMM: National Critical Mineral Mission.
Approved: January 29, 2025.
Mission period: 2024-25 to 2030-31.
Government expenditure proposed under NCMM: ₹16,300 crore; expected PSU/stakeholder investment: ₹18,000 crore.
NCMM covers exploration → mining → beneficiation → processing → recycling.
It targets 1,200 domestic critical-mineral exploration projects and four regional processing parks by 2030-31.
KABIL (Khanij Bidesh India Ltd.) is involved in acquiring/exploring overseas critical-mineral assets, including lithium blocks in Argentina.
Possible Mains Question
India's critical-mineral challenge is not limited to securing mineral deposits but extends to processing, technology, recycling and geographically concentrated supply chains. Discuss with reference to lithium and nickel.
Houthis: How a Local Yemeni Movement Became a Red Sea Power
The Houthis, officially Ansar Allah, have evolved from a Zaidi religious revival movement in northern Yemen into an armed actor capable of influencing security across the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Their rapid territorial gains along Yemen's Red Sea coast in September 2026 have increased concerns about commercial shipping and Saudi oil exports at a time when traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is also severely disrupted.
Recent fighting has included Saudi-Houthi strikes and has displaced large numbers of civilians.
This transformation, however, occurred over several decades and cannot be explained solely through the Houthis' relationship with Iran.
From the Zaidi Revival to Yemen's Civil War
The movement emerged in northern Yemen among Zaidi Shia communities, initially focusing on religious and cultural revival amid concerns about political marginalisation and competing religious influences.
Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi became a central figure, and confrontation with the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh developed into the six Saada wars between 2004 and 2010.
Hussein al-Houthi was killed in 2004, but the movement survived and became increasingly militarised.
Yemen's political instability following the Arab Spring subsequently provided the Houthis with an opportunity to expand. They took control of Sanaa in 2014.
In 2015, Saudi Arabia led a military intervention aimed at reversing Houthi gains and restoring the internationally recognised government.
Iran has provided support to the Houthis, contributing to their military capabilities. But the movement also has indigenous political, religious and tribal roots in Yemen; treating it simply as an external creation misses the domestic origins of the conflict.
Why Bab el-Mandeb Changes the Strategic Equation
Yemen occupies a strategically important position beside Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow strait connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea.
At its narrowest point, it is approximately 18 miles (29 km) wide.
Ships using the Suez Canal between Europe and the Indian Ocean normally pass through this chokepoint.
Its importance has increased because the Strait of Hormuz has also experienced severe disruption in 2026.
EIA estimates show oil and petroleum-liquid flows through Hormuz fell from 21.6 million barrels per day in Q4 2025 to 4.9 million b/d in Q2 2026, while Bab el-Mandeb flows increased to 8.1 million b/d in Q2 2026.
This makes control and disruption around Yemen's Red Sea coast consequential for global energy markets.
EIA reported in September that attacks affecting the Bab el-Mandeb route had reduced Saudi exports from Yanbu, while alternative routes were longer or more expensive.
For India, instability around these waterways can affect oil and LNG supplies, freight and insurance costs, shipping times and India-Europe trade through the Suez route.
Prelims Quick Revision
Houthis = Ansar Allah, a Yemen-based armed movement.
Origins: Zaidi Shia religious and cultural revival in northern Yemen.
Important early leader: Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi.
Six Saada wars: 2004–2010.
Houthis took control of Sanaa in 2014.
Saudi-led military intervention began in 2015.
Bab el-Mandeb: connects Red Sea with Gulf of Aden/Arabian Sea.
It lies between Yemen and the Horn of Africa.
Perim/Mayyun Island occupies a strategically important position in the strait.
Strait of Hormuz: connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman.
Bab el-Mandeb is crucial for shipping using the Suez Canal-Red Sea route.
EIA estimates 8.1 million barrels/day of crude oil and petroleum liquids passed through Bab el-Mandeb in Q2 2026.
Iran supports the Houthis, but the movement has domestic Yemeni origins and objectives.
Map together: Yemen → Bab el-Mandeb → Red Sea → Suez Canal, and Persian Gulf → Strait of Hormuz → Gulf of Oman → Arabian Sea.
Possible Mains Question
The evolution of the Houthis from a local Yemeni movement into a regional military actor demonstrates how domestic conflicts can acquire wider geopolitical and economic consequences. Discuss with reference to the strategic importance of the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
TMC Symbol Dispute: How the Election Commission Decides Which Faction Gets a Party Symbol
The Supreme Court has agreed to urgently hear Mamata Banerjee's challenge to the Election Commission of India's interim decision freezing the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) name and its reserved “Flowers and Grass” symbol amid competing claims over the party.
At this stage, the Supreme Court has not decided the merits of the dispute; it has agreed to list the petition, while noting that the rival side must also be heard.
Pending the Election Commission's final determination, the rival groups have been allotted temporary identities for the October 6 bypolls: the Banerjee-led group was allotted “Mamata All India Trinamool Congress” with the “Football Player” symbol, while the rival group was allotted “Democratic Trinamool Congress” with the “Envelope” symbol.
How Are Election-Symbol Disputes Decided?
The legal framework is the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, administered by the Election Commission.
The Order distinguishes between reserved symbols, associated with recognised political parties, and free symbols, which can be allotted to other candidates subject to its rules.
The ECI continues to administer symbol reservation and allotment under this framework.
For a split within a recognised political party, the key provision is Paragraph 15. When rival groups each claim to represent the original party, the ECI can examine the available facts and circumstances, hear the competing groups and determine that one group—or neither group—is the recognised political party.
Its determination under the Symbols Order is binding on the rival groups.
The Commission has historically examined indicators such as support within the party's organisational structure and legislative wing.
Where a clear determination cannot immediately be made—particularly when an election is approaching—the symbol may be frozen temporarily and separate symbols provided to the rival groups.
In the present TMC dispute, the ECI has taken such an interim step, rather than finally deciding which faction is entitled to the original identity.
Article 324 and the Election Commission
Article 324 of the Constitution vests the superintendence, direction and control of electoral rolls and the conduct of elections to Parliament, state legislatures, and the offices of President and Vice-President in the Election Commission.
The Chief Election Commissioner and the other Election Commissioners have equal decision-making powers.
The CEC chairs the Commission, but does not possess a superior vote over the other Election Commissioners in deciding matters before the multi-member body.
The symbol system serves an important electoral function: it provides voters with a consistent visual means of identifying candidates and political parties.
Consequently, when two factions claim the same recognised party identity, determining who may use its reserved symbol becomes part of maintaining an orderly electoral process.
Prelims Quick Revision
Article 324: constitutional basis of the Election Commission of India.
Election symbols are governed primarily by the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968.
Reserved symbol: reserved for candidates set up by a recognised political party.
Free symbol: symbol not reserved for a recognised party and available for allotment subject to the Symbols Order.
Paragraph 15: deals with rival sections/groups of a recognised political party claiming to be that party.
ECI may recognise one faction or neither faction as the original recognised party under Paragraph 15.
During a pending dispute, the Commission can use interim arrangements such as freezing the disputed symbol and providing temporary symbols to competing factions.
The present TMC arrangement is interim; it should not be described as a final determination of which faction legally represents the original AITC.
For disputes involving registered but unrecognised parties, Paragraph 15 does not operate in the same manner; such groups may have to resolve organisational disputes internally or through courts.
CEC and Election Commissioners: equal decision-making powers within the multi-member Election Commission.
Possible Mains Question
How does the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 empower the Election Commission to deal with splits in recognised political parties? Discuss the significance of Paragraph 15 in ensuring certainty and continuity during elections.
Article 371K for Ladakh: How It Could Create a New Constitutional Model
The Union government has proposed a new Article 371K to provide special constitutional safeguards for Ladakh, following negotiations with representatives of the Leh Apex Body and Kargil Democratic Alliance.
The proposal envisages a directly elected Union Territory-level governing body with legislative authority over subjects such as land, culture and language, forests, environment and natural resources.
A crucial qualification is that Article 371K does not yet exist in the Constitution. As of September 24, 2026, no final constitutional text has been enacted, and important questions concerning executive, financial and planning powers, as well as police and public order, remain under discussion. Further negotiations are expected.
Why Does Ladakh Want Constitutional Safeguards?
Ladakh became a Union Territory without a legislature under the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.
Since then, political groups in Leh and Kargil have sought stronger democratic representation and safeguards concerning land, employment, cultural identity and Ladakh's environmentally fragile landscape.
The proposed arrangement is significant because it is being conceived as a sui generis—or unique—constitutional model. Ladakh's administration has said the proposal is neither statehood nor an ordinary Union Territory legislature.
Instead, it would create a special elected governing institution through a constitutional amendment.
This would make Article 371K different from existing Articles 371A–371J, which contain state-specific provisions.
Ladakh is a Union Territory, so extending an Article 371-type arrangement to it would represent a new constitutional design.
Article 371 and the Sixth Schedule: What Is the Difference?
Part XXI of the Constitution contains “Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions”. Articles 371 to 371J provide different arrangements for particular states rather than one uniform model.
The official Constitution, for example, gives Nagaland special protection under Article 371A over specified matters such as Naga religious or social practices, customary law and ownership and transfer of land and its resources; Article 371G contains comparable protections for Mizoram. Article 371J provides special development, education and employment arrangements for the Hyderabad-Karnataka region, now called Kalyana Karnataka.
The Sixth Schedule, by contrast, provides constitutionally recognised Autonomous District and Regional Councils in tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram, with specified legislative, judicial and administrative powers.
The proposed Article 371K appears structurally different: rather than simply extending the Sixth Schedule's district-level model, negotiations envisage a UT-level directly elected body with authority over specified subjects.
Its precise relationship with the existing Leh and Kargil hill councils can only be determined once an actual draft is released.
Prelims Quick Revision
Part XXI: Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions.
Article 371: special provisions relating to Maharashtra and Gujarat.
Article 371A: Nagaland — important protections concerning customary practices, customary law and land/resources.
371B: Assam — committee of the Legislative Assembly.
371C: Manipur — special arrangements concerning Hill Areas.
371D & 371E: Andhra Pradesh/Telangana-related provisions; Article 371E concerns establishment of a Central University in Andhra Pradesh.
371F: Sikkim — special constitutional arrangements following its integration into India.
371G: Mizoram — safeguards concerning specified social/religious practices, customary law and land.
371H: Arunachal Pradesh — special responsibility of Governor regarding law and order.
371I: Goa — Legislative Assembly shall have at least 30 members.
371J: Karnataka — special provisions concerning the Kalyana Karnataka region.
Sixth Schedule: applies to specified tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.
Ladakh: Union Territory without a legislature under the present arrangement.
Proposed Article 371K is not yet part of the Constitution.
Current proposal envisages a directly elected UT-level governing body, with legislative powers over specified subjects including land, culture/language, forests, environment and natural resources.
No final draft has yet settled the full range of executive, financial, planning, police or law-and-order powers.
Therefore, claims that Article 371K already “guarantees” particular rights or powers should be avoided until the constitutional amendment is drafted and enacted.
Possible Mains Question
The proposed Article 371K for Ladakh could represent a new model of asymmetric constitutional governance for a Union Territory. Compare the proposed arrangement with the special provisions under Article 371 and the autonomous governance framework of the Sixth Schedule.
Rhesus Macaque Conflict in Himachal Pradesh: Conservation, Control and Compensation
The death of a 63-year-old woman in Shimla following an encounter with rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) has renewed attention on human-monkey conflict in Himachal Pradesh.
The issue has an important legal dimension: after restructuring of the schedules under the Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2022, the rhesus macaque does not appear in the current protected-species schedules of the Act.
The amendment was brought into force in 2023.
This has raised practical questions over which agencies should manage urban monkey populations, how victims should be compensated, and how population control can be reconciled with ecological considerations.
Why Human-Macaque Conflict Is Increasing
The rhesus macaque is a highly adaptable and social primate found widely across northern India and other parts of Asia.
Its ability to exploit human food makes towns, temples, tourist centres and agricultural landscapes particularly attractive.
Himachal Pradesh's Forest Department identifies habitat loss, accessible food in garbage, crop-raiding and close interaction with humans as important drivers of conflict.
Feeding by people can further habituate macaques to human presence and reduce their natural avoidance behaviour.
Himachal has responded principally through population management rather than indiscriminate removal.
Its monkey sterilisation programme began in 2006-07, and official data record 1,86,448 sterilizations through 2023-24.
The state's estimated rhesus population declined from 3,17,512 in 2004 to 1,36,443 in 2020, although these figures do not by themselves establish that sterilisation was the sole cause of the decline.
Rhesus Macaque vs Bonnet Macaque
Both are macaques, but they are different species.
Rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta) is particularly widespread across northern India and has a relatively short tail. Bonnet macaque (Macaca radiata) is associated mainly with peninsular and southern India and is recognisable by the characteristic whorl of hair on its head resembling a bonnet.
For Prelims, this distinction is useful because the current Wild Life (Protection) Act's schedules should be checked species by species rather than assuming all monkeys have identical legal protection.
The current statutory schedule lists several macaque species, while Macaca mulatta is absent.
Managing Conflict Without Ignoring Ecology
A durable response requires more than capturing individual animals. Urban solid-waste management, monkey-proof garbage storage, restrictions on deliberate feeding, habitat improvement, scientifically monitored sterilisation and public awareness can reduce the food incentives that draw macaques into settlements.
Himachal's official strategy already includes sterilisation, awareness campaigns, habitat enrichment with fruit-bearing vegetation, improved solid-waste management and research into macaque behaviour.
Rhesus macaques also remain part of ecosystems even where they become locally abundant.
As omnivorous primates, they participate in food webs and ecological processes such as consumption and dispersal of plant material.
Thus, local human-wildlife conflict and a species' broader conservation status are separate questions: abundance in a town does not by itself settle how the species should be managed across its range.
Prelims Quick Revision
Rhesus macaque: Macaca mulatta.
It is an Old World monkey and a highly adaptable primate.
It is particularly widespread in northern India.
Bonnet macaque: Macaca radiata; primarily associated with peninsular India.
Habitat fragmentation: division of a continuous habitat into smaller, increasingly isolated patches.
Major conflict drivers include habitat change, easily accessible garbage, deliberate feeding, crop availability and habituation to humans.
The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 is India's principal legislation for protecting wild animals, plants and their habitats and regulating wildlife-related activities.
The 2022 Amendment substantially reorganised the Act's schedules; the rhesus macaque is absent from the current protected-species schedules.
Himachal Pradesh has used mass sterilisation as a population-management measure.
Official Himachal data record 1,86,448 macaques sterilised through 2023-24.
Human-wildlife conflict management can combine population management + waste management + habitat measures + behavioural interventions + public awareness + compensation/relief mechanisms.
Possible Mains Question
Human-wildlife conflict cannot be addressed solely through population control or changes in the legal status of a species. Discuss with reference to the rhesus macaque conflict in Himachal Pradesh.
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